REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
To study such a Perfect Equilibrium, we begin, therefore, by analysing the final stage of the game-being the choice of price, given the number of entrants and the qualities of their respective products (Section 2). We will then proceed, in Section 3, to examine the choice of quality by firms, and in Section 4 we consider the entry decision. Section 5 contains a summary of the argument, and develops some conclusions.
PRICE COMPETITION
Consider a number of firms producing distinct, substitute goods. ' We label their respective products by an index k = 1, . . . , n where firm k sells product k at price Pk. Assume a continuum of consumers identical in tastes but differing in income; incomes are uniformly distributed, viz. the density equals unity on some support 0 < a ct _'? b.
Consumers make indivisible and mutually exclusive purchases from among these n goods, in the sense that a consumer either makes no purchase, or else buys exactly one unit from one of the n firms.2 We denote by U(t, k) the utility achieved by consuming one unit of product k and t units of "income" (the latter may be thought of as a Hicksian "composite commodity", measured as a continuous variable); and by U(t, 0) the utility derived from consuming t units of income only.
Assume 
This is easily checked by reference to (1). Now it follows immediately on inspection of (1) that consumers with income t > tk strictly prefer good k at price Pk to good k -1 at Pk-1, and conversely; whence consumers are partitioned into segments corresponding to the successive market shares of rival firms.
Assuming zero costs the profit (revenue) of the k-th firm is: Now, at equilibrium (if it exists), it follows trivially that the top quality product will enjoy a positive market share; moreover if any product has zero market share, so also do all lower quality products. Now where n products co-exist at equilibrium (i.e. each of these n goods has a positive market share) the first order necessary conditions for profit (revenue) maximization take the form, Now by assumption b < 4a, so that tn-1 < a i.e. the top two firms cover the market. Thus equilibrium involves at most two products. II
The idea here is that price competition between "high quality" products drives their prices down to a level at which not even the poorest consumer would prefer to buy certain lower quality products even at price zero. Clearly, the number of products which can survive at equilibrium depends on the distribution of income. Lemma 1 provides a restriction, that b <4a, which is sufficient to limit this number to at most two; we shall in fact be concerned with this case in what follows.
It will be convenient at this point, then, to cite the special form of the revenue functions and the first order conditions for the case where n = 2, i.e. where exactly two firms enjoy a positive market share.
We define 
We identify three regions as illustrated in Figure 1 . For a certain range of P2 chosen by firm 2, the optimal reply of firm 1 leads to an outcome (t1, t2) in region II, i.e. t1 = a, a V -t2-a(V + 1). Over this range firm 1 leaves its price constant as P2 varies; at the price Pi it chooses, the poorest consumer is just willing to buy good 1. Firm 1 faces a demand schedule which is kinked at this price level (given P2); and either raising or lowering price reduces revenue. Thus we have a corner solution, and the equalities of (7) are replaced by a pair of inequalities. Moreover, we note from equations (7), (8) Hence the two functions (7), (8) intersect at a point such that t1 > 0, t2> a, so that the two products coexist with positive market shares.
To verify that this solution is indeed an equilibrium, it must further be shown that the second order conditions are satisfied, i.e. the revenue function of firm 1, given P2, is concave, over all Pi; and conversely. This may be verified in a straightforward manner. Moreover, since b <4a, (b -a)/3a < 1 and the condition for the solution to be in region III cannot be met (as V > 1) so the market is covered. || From this point forward we shall assume that 2a < b < 4a. The preceding discussion establishes the existence of a unique price pair which forms a Nash Equilibrium in prices, for any two distinct levels of product quality. Moreover, both firms enjoy strictly positive revenue. If on the other hand the firms choose the same level of quality, our use of a non-cooperative price equilibrium ensures that both prices become zero (the Bertrand duopoly case); so that both firms have revenue zero at equilibrium. In either case, the equilibrium vector of payoffs (revenues) is uniquely determined via our preceding discussion.
We now turn to the case where more than two firms enter the industry. Still assuming, as always, that 2a < b <4a, we distinguish two cases. If one firm has a quality lower than either of its rivals, it has a zero market share, and so revenue zero, as shown in Lemma 1. If two (or three) firms have an equal lowest quality, then the price of this lowest quality product is zero at equilibrium (again from the usual Bertrand argument). In either case, any firm setting the lowest, or equal lowest, quality, has revenue zero at equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium vector of payoffs (revenues) of the firms present in the industry is uniquely determined via our preceding characterization.
COMPETITION IN QUALITY
We now turn to the preceding stage of the process, in which firms choose quality. Let k denote the number of firms who have entered. We introduce the notation Gk to denote the 2-stage game in which quality is first chosen, and then price.
Finding a perfect equilibrium in Gk is equivalent to finding a Nash equilibrium in qualities, the payoffs arising from any vector of qualities being defined by the (unique) equilibrium vector of revenues in the "choice of price" game of the preceding section.
We suppose for the moment that the number of firms is exactly two, deferring the question of further "potential entrants" until later.
Each firm chooses a level of quality, being a value ui, u0 < ui < i, where u7 is an exogenously given upper bound on quality.
We introduce the notation R(u; v) to denote the revenue of a firm whose product is of quality u, its rival's product being of quality v, at a Nash equilibrium in prices.
We will establish the existence of an equilibrium involving differentiated products, as a consequence of two properties of the revenue function R (u; v). The first property, stated in Lemma 3, is that, at equilibrium, the revenue of the firm offering the higher quality product is greater. The second property (Lemma 4) states that the revenue of both firms increases as the quality of the better product improves. The latter property reflects the effect of the lessening of price competition as qualities diverge, and is the key to the existence of an equilibrium with differentiated products in the present analysis. 
Both these expressions increase with u2, for u2_ u1, whence our result follows. The denominator is positive since V>1 so the sign coincides with that of the numerator. We wish to establish therefore, that the numerator is negative; but since it is a linear increasing function of V it suffices to show that it is negative when V takes its maximum value in region II i. and the choice of a is indeed optimal for firm 2 as required. I
We have thus established that with 2 firms present, a Nash Equilibrium in qualities exists, which is a Perfect Equilibrium in the two stage game ("choice of quality, choice of price").
We now consider the outcome if k > 2 firms are present. We aim to show here, (i) that the choice of a by all firms is a Nash Equilibrium,5 and (ii) that for any Nash Equilibrium, all firms have revenue zero. (Up to this point we have confined our attention to equilibria in pure strategies. In fact the proof of (ii) extends trivially to mixed strategies, and we will establish the result in this more general setting below.) Proposition 2. (i) The game Gk, k > 2 has a Nash Equilibrium ui = a, 1 _i_k.
(ii) For every Nash Equilibrium of Gk the payoff for each firm is zero.
Proof. (i) Suppose all firms but one choose a. Then at least 2 firms sell an identical product of quality a; following the familiar Bertrand argument for a non-cooperative price equilibrium between two firms selling an identical produet, we have immediately that each of these firms sets price zero. Hence our remaining firm earns payoff zero for any choice u -a; for either its price is zero (at u = u) or its sales are zero (at u < a).
Hence Gk has a Nash Equilibrium, ui = a, 1 < i < k.
(ii) In order to establish this, we show that in every Perfect Equilibrium at least two firms adopt the pure strategy a; whence the result follows immediately.
Let ,u' be a probability measure on [u0, a] and let {u i} be a Nash Equilibrium for Gk. Let Vi be the lim inf of the support of ,u'. Assume V1i ' V2 ' * Vk, and furthermore assume that if any of the g' has an atom at V, then we label the firms so as to denote it (or one such firm) as 1.
First we show that the payoff of 1 is zero. If V, is an atom of ,u 1 then the pure strategy V1 yields payoff zero to firm 1 (given A 2 ..., . Ak); for here the probability is zero that firm 1 offers the (sole) highest quality; or the (sole) second highest quality, product, whence from the analysis of the non-cooperative price equilibrium it earns payoff zero.
If, on the other hand, ,u1 does not have an atom at V1 then there is a descending sequence of points in the support of u 1 with limit V1. The payoff of all these points as pure strategies is the same, but it tends to zero in the limit where quality approaches V1: for the probability of the limit point V1 being the (sole) highest quality, or the (sole) second highest quality, is zero (none of the A'-has an atom at V1). Thus the payoff to firm 1 is zero.
We may now deduce that at least two firms adopt the pure strategy a. Suppose firstly that none of the strategies 1,... , 1k is the pure strategy u. Then there is a neighbourhood of a, and an E > 0, such that with probability e > 0 none of the firms 2, ... , k choose a quality in that neighbourhood. Now we have just shown that the payoff to firm 1 is zero; we now note that ,u can not be an optimal strategy, for by choosing the pure strategy ui firm 1 can now achieve a strictly positive payoff.
Thus at least one of the strategies 1,... ,u k is the pure strategy a. Denote it Ak
Assume that no other firm adopts this strategy. Then there is a neighbourhood of a, and an E >0, such that with probability E >0 none of the firms 2,... ., k -1 choose a quality in this neighbourhood. Firm 1 can thus earn a strictly positive payoff by choosing its quality in this interval. Hence at least two of the A 1, .. . .,k are the pure strategy u7. Hence all payoffs are zero. || 
ENTRY
We have now shown how, in the present model, only two firms can survive with positive prices, and positive market shares, at equilibrium; and how the entry of further firms leads to a configuration in which the top quality product is available at price zero, while all firms earn zero revenue (profits).
We now consider the analysis of entry to the industry. We introduce a "small" cost6 of entry e > 0; our results in fact are independent of the size of e. We define the game Gk as the game Gk introduced above, with E subtracted from all payoffs. Let there be n potential entrants; they play the three stage game En as follows. At the first stage each firm decides whether to enter or not; according as the number who choose to enter is k, these k firms then play the game Gr. Those firms who choose not to enter receive payoff zero.
We establish:
Proposition 3. For any e > 0 (sufficiently small), and any number n > 2 of potential entrants (i) there exists a Perfect Equilibrium in which two firms enter; and in which they produce distinct products, and have positive revenues (profits).
(ii) no Perfect Equilibrium exists in which k > 2 firms enter.
Proof. Corresponding to any pair7 of firms drawn from n potential entrants, given a decision by these two firms to enter, the payoff to each of the other firms from not entering is zero, while the payoff from entering is -E by virtue of Proposition 2. This establishes (ii). Where exactly two firms enter however, each earns a positive payoff (since e is "small"); and then (i) follows immediately from Proposition 1.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have here described a perfect equilibrium of a three stage game in which a number of firms choose firstly, whether to entry an industry; secondly, the quality of their respective products, and thirdly, their prices.
At the final stage of the game, in a non-cooperative price equilibrium, there is an upper bound to the number of firms which enjoy positive market shares, at positive prices (production costs being assumed zero). This reflects the fact that competition between the surviving "high quality" products drives their prices down to a point at which not even the poorest consumer prefers the (excluded) low quality products even at price zero. This number reflects inter alia the utility functions of consumers and the shape of the income distribution. We have here taken a particular form of utility function and assumed a uniform distribution of incomes on [a, b] where 2a < b < 4a; whence our upper bound is 2. It can be shown by extending our discussion in a natural way, that this upper bound rises as the range of incomes increases.
We establish two results which form the core of the analysis. (a) We show that where the number of firms equals 2, these two firms will choose distinct qualities, and both will enjoy positive profit at equilibrium. The intuitive idea behind this result is that, as their qualities become close, price competition between the increasingly similar products reduces the profit of both firms.
(b) We show that if three or more firms are present, competition in choice of quality drives all firms to set the same "top" level of quality permitted while prices, and so profits, become zero. This reflects the fact that no one of the three firms will now prefer to set its quality lower than that of its two rivals, as it would thereby certainly earn revenue zero at equilibrium.
Combining (a) and (b) and introducing a small cost of entry E, we deduce that the only Perfect Equilibrium in the three stage game is one in which exactly two firms enter; in which they produce distinct products, and earn positive profits at equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium configuration is independent of e.
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